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Abstract
Change in Myanmar came from above, below, within, abroad, and the fore. This précis of
Pathways That Changed Myanmar explains how a multidimensional understanding of change
in Myanmar can help to explain the military junta’s decision to move towards a pacted
transition. Subversion and creation at the grassroots level transformed the distribution of
opportunities, leverage, power, incentives, and influences, as did the global effort to name,
shame, and sanction the regime. Decades of contention from the National League for
Democracy and many ethnic political groups, in combination with the impact of the Third
Force, a network that sought to engage the regime even at the highest ranks, made space for a
civilian parliament. At the grassroots level and in elite political circles, the efforts of those
seeking change in Myanmar combined to transform the environment and conditions of
governance, culminating a situation in which junta leadership in Naypyidaw had to make a
move.
Keywords: Myanmar, resistance, change, strategy, morality, marginalization

On Pathways That Changed Myanmar: A Précis

51

Myanmar’s pivot towards a new era of governance provides an apt opportunity to
pause and reflect on how this change came about. Beyond simply recounting stories of
oppression, resistance, and overcoming shared by over 500 informants from throughout
Myanmar during the pivotal window from 2009 to the November 2015 elections, Pathways
That Changed Myanmar extracts lessons from the multiple, contrasting struggles that brought
about the transition. Pathways That Changed Myanmar (hereafter Pathways), thus, adds to an
expanding body of literature on the events leading up to and surrounding the dissolution of
the Myanmar military junta. Using select works for comparison, this précis attempts to
position Pathways in the field and elaborate on what Pathways contributes to ongoing
debates. In doing so, this précis highlights a number of unique attributes. Firstly, while many
scholars focus on the manifestation of change at the highest ranks of government, lending to a
view of change in Myanmar as emanating from above, Pathways argues for a
multidimensional understanding. While change did manifest as the military strategically
opening certain doors for democratic forces, this pacted transition is the product of
cumulative pressures and influences that came from above, below, within, abroad, and the
fore. Subversion and creation at the grassroots level transformed the distribution of
opportunities, leverage, power, incentives, and influences, as did the global effort to name,
shame, and sanction the regime. Decades of contention from the National League for
Democracy and many ethnic political groups, in combination with the impact of the Third
Force, a network that sought to engage the regime even at the highest ranks, made space for a
civilian parliament. At the grassroots level and in elite political circles, the efforts of those
seeking change in Myanmar combined to transform the environment and conditions of
governance, culminating a situation in which junta leadership in Naypyidaw had to make a
move.
Related to the assertion that change in Myanmar emanated from diverse sources,
Pathways illustrates the contrasts between the different strategies, sacrifices, and struggles
that were underway in the country. Mullen (2016) notes that “[m]etaphorical pathways to
change converged, intersected, diverged, and collided, creating a grid that was both mighty
and messy” (p. 111). Indeed, a central argument in Pathways is that positioning certain forces
or struggles as inherently more righteous and meaningful than others is often subjective and
misguided and exacerbates tensions. To illustrate this point, the précis surveys various
debates and dynamics, including a deconstruction of contrasting histories of sanctions against
Myanmar. Lastly, this précis asks what the findings and discussions in Pathways mean in the
context of Myanmar’s ongoing transition, warning that the current wave of xenophobia and
the momentum behind formalizing efforts is foreclosing on space for Myanmar to adequately
account for its predatory past. The current transitional course may be quickly heading
towards lost land and lost hope for those in desperate need of protection and mobility.
Locating the Source(s) of Change
Renaud Egreteau’s (2016) work in Caretaking Democratization: The Military and
Political Change in Myanmar provides a thorough appraisal of the pacted nature of
Myanmar’s transition, showing how careful and strategic the military was in retaining an
autonomous command, with much clout over the actions of the state. Egreteau shows the way
in which the military simultaneously invited and corralled democratic forces, protecting
military power and ranking personnel in the process. Similarly, in Democratisation of
Myanmar, Nehginpao Kipgen (2016) presents a convincing argument that while democratic
forces in Myanmar chose to come to the negotiating table, processes and reforms closely
align with the former jutna’s seven step road map towards a disciplined democracy. Kipgen’s
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work raises important questions about whose vision of Myanmar is taking shape. In an earlier
effort, Jones (2014a) notes the peace process as an important variable motivating the junta’s
decision to liberalize:
Far from suddenly liberalizing in 2010, the regime sought to create a “disciplined
democracy” to safeguard its preferred social and political order twice before, but was
thwarted by societal opposition. Its success in 2010 stemmed from a strategy of
coercive state-building and economic incorporation via “ceasefire capitalism,” which
weakened and co-opted much of the opposition. Having altered the balance of forces
in its [favor], the regime felt sufficiently confident to impose its preferred settlement.
Pathways concurs with the framing of this transition as strategically pacted in a way that
favors the military. Beyond this, however, Pathways brings the focus to how the
circumstances around the regime changed. Why would the junta bother with a pact in the first
place? Pathways argues that the answer lies in the change in circumstances around the
regime. The regime’s moves represent more than a shift in mindset. The pivot to transition
also represents more than a game of elite politics. The junta’s calculated dissolution
represents a change in the milieu. Pathways argues that new dynamics and circumstances left
the junta with little or no choice but to change. Interests, priorities, capabilities, leverage, and
power were shifting, leading to a new governance climate. Surveying the many forces of
change that Pathways brings into focus and illustrating the way which they were able to shift
relations, leverage, expectations, and capacities, one can begin to imagine a scenario in which
the junta is scrambling for control.
In seemingly every community under military-ruled Myanmar, grassroots organizers
began local enterprises, schools, trainings, and projects to mobilize local resources and create
new opportunities. These community efforts lent to new orbits of protection, resiliency, and
empowerment that had an untold impact on local power relations. Such grassroots change
was often made possible by an influx of remittances pouring in from the millions of migrant
workers from Myanmar, many of whom were taking on some of the toughest jobs the world
has on offer. When speaking with analysts in and around Myanmar, remittances repeatedly
gained praise as one of the force multipliers that began winds of change in Myanmar. On the
global stage, foreign governments and global campaigns rallied around the democracy
movement and the National League for Democracy’s most notable figure, Aung San Suu Kyi.
She and others stood up, spoke out, and took to the streets against the junta, even when it
meant certain harm at the hands of the military dictatorship. Their actions were a constant
reminder of how brutal, devastating, and unsustainable military rule was. While the clash
between the democracy movement and the junta continued, a network known as the Third
Force chose engagement and avoidance to change the conversation, deliver new services and
opportunities, and create space for new ideas and initiatives to flourish.
The framing of change presented in Pathways does not necessarily contradict or
challenge those of others. Rather Pathways simply offers a distinct focus and explanation of
what brought about the transition. Indeed, while Pathways highlights all of the pressures and
shifts that transformed the environment around the junta, Egreteau’s (2016) work brings the
focus back to the strategic pact that has left the military with an autonomous command and
much clout. Both frames point to a transitioning state that remains substantively praetorian.
And both have their own utility for understanding Myanmar’s current transition and other
struggles against authoritarianism throughout the world.
Contention, Subversion and Creation: Interwoven Impact
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Contrasting forces of change had contrasting visions of what Myanmar should look
like and how to get there. Moral or strategic high grounds were not easy to find in militaryruled Myanmar. Disagreements on priorities, strategy, morality, and sacrifice were
compounded by competition for limited attention and resources. The junta’s repression of
speech and movement made it difficult for disparate forces of change to communicate. The
story of how many strategies and struggles ultimately brought Myanmar into transition is
complex, and often messy. It is a story that is very human, featuring intense emotions,
resiliency, brutality, overcoming, setbacks, and inconvenient realities. Pathways attempts to
tell the story of change in Myanmar with the complexity it deserves. In doing so, Pathways is
careful not to imply that any struggles were more important or righteous than others. Rather,
Pathways positions disparate strategies and struggles as irreplaceable parts of an interwoven
grid of transformative action and impact.
Distinct networks, strategies, worldviews, interests, and capabilities translated to
contrasting roles in the struggle to change Myanmar, none of which should be demoted or
written out of the story of change in Myanmar. There is no way of knowing or proving
whether one particular force was more important than another. One might assume that a
certain approach, namely confronting and speaking truth to tyranny, is inherently more
righteous and effective than more unconventional or quiet pursuits of change. But the story of
change in Myanmar brings this into question. This section explains the way in which
subversion had an immeasurable impact by undermining the junta’s system and providing a
foundation for further action. The moral or strategic high ground was a matter of perspective.
Forging degree of importance or merit, even implicitly, misrepresents the multiplicity of
action and impact that became interwoven to the point that tracing causation became
impossible.
Mapping different strategies and actions illustrates divergence, creating a Linnaean
grid of disparate efforts or pathways. Each pathway had a particular purpose and function.
Struggles were not, however, separate from one another. The grid of pathways was
interwoven in a way that was both complicated and mighty. And in this grid, three broad
pathways stood out: contention, subversion and creation. Contention, known more formally
as contentious politics, entails people organizing and publicly challenging political targets.
This pathway was familiar to anyone following military-ruled Myanmar. In fact, contentious
politics is familiar to anyone who watches the news. Audiences have an important role in
contentious politics, which is why this pathway is interchangeably called contentious
performances. McAdams et al. provide perhaps the most complete summation of what
contentious politics entails, namely the “public, collective making of consequential claims by
connected clusters of persons on other clusters of persons or on major political actors, when
at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a third party to the claims”
(2007, p. 2). Tilly follows up, asserting, “Contentious politics . . . brings together three
familiar features of social life: contention, collective action, and politics” (2008, p. 5). These
three fixed properties define the scope of interest. For an action to be of interest, it must first
be contentious.
The 8/8/88 uprising,1 the ethnic armed movements, the 2007 Saffron Revolution,2 and
the struggle of Aung San Suu Kyi and thousands of other prisoners of conscience
demonstrated a clear commitment to contention and, as a result, captured and inspired
international audiences. Sentiments around taking to the streets, standing up, fighting back,
galvanize those watching and act as a catalyst for solidarity and action. Yet when traveling
throughout military-ruled Myanmar, very few displays of contentious politics could be found.
Instead, one readily found more subtle, constant methods of resistance: everyday resistance.
Scott and Kerkvliet describe this second pathway, everyday forms of resistance, as “a vast
and relatively unexplored middle-ground of peasant politics between passivity and open,
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collective defiance,” which entails the use of “the ordinary weapons of subordinate groups”
for purposes of “self-help” (1986, p. 1). More specifically, everyday resistance entails tactics
ranging from “foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, feigned ignorance, desertion,
pilfering, smuggling, poaching, arson, slander, sabotage, surreptitious assault and murder,
anonymous threats, and so on” (Scott, 1989, p. 5). Subversion was a part of everyday life in
military-ruled Myanmar to the point that everyday resistance seemingly became
subconscious. Subversive techniques allowed even the most marginalized and threatened
communities to constantly avoid, undercut, and, when possible, disrupt the system. Narratives
of millions of ordinary citizens all over Myanmar undermining the junta’s machine day in
and day out through subversion did not make headlines, but the cumulative meaning and
impact was immeasurable. This is a point of disagreement between scholars and practitioners
who study struggles against oppression from different angles. Scott and Kerkvliet, who focus
on everyday resistance and argue against the notion that subversion is inherently less
meaningful than contention, summarize a common critique of everyday forms of resistance:
Although Christine White never says explicitly what constitutes resistance, we infer
what she says it is not, and from her examples, that her criteria are more limiting than
those of others. She seems to distinguish ‘resistance’ in quotes, from real resistance, at
least in a colonial or capitalistic system. Real resistance decisively alters colonial or
capitalistic state policies or contributes to transforming the system, not just delaying
the advance of exploitative policies of, say, the state and landlords. Similarly,
‘resistance’ is only a safety valve and contributes to a false-consciousness, giving
peasants temporary relief and thus obscuring the extent of their powerlessness and
exploitation. (1986, p. 2)
Pathways weighs in on two elements of this debate. On the question of whether
everyday resistance should be seen as political and meaningful, distinct but not necessarily
subordinate to traditional contention, Pathways illustrates how everyday resistance fed into
not only local but systemic change:
…[P]lacing everyday resistance as part of a broader struggle for change, this pathway
was not only meaningful but foundational. Everyday resistance was foundational in
that it neutralized attempts to dominate and made it possible for the struggle, for
pursuits of change, to endure. Everyday resistance allowed people to constantly push
back and sustain their struggle. It was a pathway in and of itself, because this type of
action affects relations and the system itself. Everyday resistance made the imposition
of tyranny an exhausting exercise. It was constant, lurking, everywhere. In this sense,
everyday resistance made the struggle for change in military-ruled Myanmar
exhausting for those governing and sustainable for those defying such governance.
(Mullen, 2016, p 76)
Indeed, Myanmar is a case study in the how the political muscles of grassroots communities
and individuals can flex and create ripples, even in the absence of formal organization and
protest.
On the second element of this debate, there was debate in and around military-ruled
Myanmar about what separates resistance from survival or simply everyday life. Some took
the position that to survive under the junta’s systems was in and of itself resistance. Others
emphasized the distinction between resistance and simply living. Drawing such boundaries
around resistance was seen as a way to avoid trivializing resistance by seeing everything that
happens in an oppressive environment as resistance. On this point, Pathways makes the
following observation:
Not all farming is resistance. But farming that directly challenges directives from
officials or occurs as part of broader efforts to undermine the status quo should
absolutely be seen as resistance. In other words, when farming feeds resistance, it is
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part of the resistance equation. Beyond farming, people pursued and held on to a
satisfaction in self, family, and community, allowing them to pursue change when the
time was right. Trivializing the action that makes resistance and change possible
produces a narrow understanding of how change behavior comes to fruition. (Mullen,
2016, p. 84).
Creation, the third broad pathway that changed Myanmar, was a realm of action that
did not have a theory or academic study to help give it meaning. Contentious politics capture
contention. Everyday resistance explains and provides a framework for subversion. But
creation was a separate field of political action in need of its own theoretical framing. To
better explain and understand how creation contributed to change in Myanmar, Pathways
offers reconstructive politics. Developed while in the field and observing the transformative
nature of creation, this theory captures the creation of change via the creation of new space,
opportunities, and relationships. ‘Reconstructors’ throughout Myanmar disguised their intent
and embarked in a brick-by-brick process of creation and recreation. Anyone could use this
pathway to change, including those in the junta chain of command. This is because anyone
could engage in calculated compliance, negotiation, relationship building, concealed capacity
building, avoidance, or bribery. These techniques were meant to avoid, disorient, and
persuade, allowing people to sideline, soften, or penetrate the state. It is in the how that the
art of reconstructive politics lies. Reconstructors did not use contention, claims, or noncompliance. Their efforts blended in with business as usual, as everyday efforts to make life a
little bit better. Knowing whom to approach and how to do so, whom to avoid, what they had
to offer, what they could exploit, and what they could get away with, individuals were able to
reconstruct the status quo around them.
Combined, these three pathways changed Myanmar. The contrasts between these
three pathways are obvious. Even in theory, confrontation and engagement clash. Visible,
declared, and confrontational, contentious politics juxtaposes the hidden, disguised, and
disorienting nature of everyday resistance and reconstructive politics. Contentious politics is
about capturing attention, while the latter two pathways favor elusiveness. Contention, by
definition, confronts authority, whereas the latter pathways seek to subvert, soften, infiltrate,
and make irrelevant. Reconstructive politics and everyday forms of resistance focus on the
everyday, making their politic of interest ‘everyday politics.’ This is distinct from contentious
politics’ interest in the performative aspects of politics, including formal, public claimmaking, and institutional responses.
Moving from theory to practice, things get all the more complicated. Personalities,
priorities, experiences, and policy measures come into the mix. Some people clearly chose
their pathway to change. Others may have been more reactive. Either way, behind each
pathway was a will. When people felt as though their struggles and efforts were being
questioned or brushed aside, frustrations and tensions intensified. Even in a situation in which
impact is difficult if not impossible to measure—and so multiple forces are contributing to a
cumulative impact—there is a propensity to search for that one group or force multiplier that
deserves particular recognition. Pathways does this when bringing attention to the role of
remittances and the importance of creation in the story of change. This is not meant to elevate
remittances and creation as topics that are more important or deserving than others. Rather,
this is meant to highlight elements of the struggle for change in Myanmar that had not
previously been adequately brought into focus. Even when emphasizing remittances and
creation, Pathways pulls back and positions these efforts as part of contrasting strategies and
contributions, all of which are irreplaceable and deserving parts of the same formula or grid.
Pathways challenges tendencies to position groups and strategies in a hierarchy of
importance and merit. Around military-ruled Myanmar, narratives would regularly position
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD as the source of all that was righteous that would
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independently catalyze change. Claims about degrees of importance can be explicit. Popham
(2012) states: “In Myanmar, which was ruled for half a century by its army, more than two
decades of sanctions finally seem to be doing the trick. That is a good reason to keep the
pressure on until the Burmese people are truly free.” Lall (2012) takes an alternative stance:
“Activist lobbies located in the West or on the border have increasingly been claiming that it
was their isolationist policies and the sanctions regime that have brought about these changes
. . . But in fact it is in-country civil society organizations, both ethnic and Bama [Burmese],
which have worked tirelessly over the last five years to bring about change.” Marie Lall’s
(2016) recent book, Understanding Reform in Myanmar provides a thorough analysis of the
role of Myanmar’s civil society in bringing about change. While concurring with Egreteau’s
assessment that this transition has been strategically pacted, Lall’s thesis is more specifically
about the role of the Third Force as the key source of change in Myanmar. Ashley South’s
(2016) review of Lall (2016) provides a useful observation:
For Lall, Nay Win Maung and his colleagues at the Myanmar Egress deserve much of
the credit for spurring this change before and after the 2010 elections. According to
this reading, the transition in Burma is primarily indigenous, driven by a need for an
escape (“egress”) from decades of military (mis)rule and by the passion and vision of
a small group of Burmese society activists.
One might question whether the Myanmar Egress guys (and they are mostly men) can
really be described as a part of civil society, given their cozy business and
government connections. For me, Lall somewhat overplays the role of Myanmar
Egress, which later gave birth to the Myanmar Peace Center, [which] opened in late
2012. Both institutions have been hugely influential in the country’s transition. Yet
other factors should also be taken into account.
In line with Lall, Pathways asserts that the Third Force had an important and unique impact
on the change in Myanmar. However, Pathways again pulls back to the position that seeing
the Third Force’s footprint as somehow more important than other factors falls into the trap
of hierarchical or overly exclusive explanations of what brought about change in Myanmar.
At the point that stories of change in Myanmar propose an overly exclusive or hierarchical
understanding, they risk misrepresenting the situation and marginalizing the struggles and
contributions of deserving parties.
Frustration, Fractures and Recognition
Contention juxtaposing engagement, claims juxtaposing avoidance, performance
juxtaposing subversion, all of these apparent contradictions overlaid a context within which
forces of change had to vie for limited international attention and resources. Tensions went
beyond competition to confrontation. Hostilities among different networks working towards
change were palpable, and everyone seemed to take interest in the drama. Things escalated to
the point that the movement “turned on itself,” to borrow the assessment of a local analyst
(Mullen, 2016, p. 111). Tensions between contrasting forces had complex sources.
Frustration and fractures would develop amongst those pushing for change, even though their
common target or nemesis was the junta. Everyone was clear that the junta was ultimately
responsible for suffering. Yet while the Generals in Naypyidaw felt out of reach, networks
would take aim at one another. This may have been cathartic (and in this sense, it may have
been healthy). Further, the junta’s system disrupted expression, movement, and
communication generally. Rather than sitting down and speaking about differences of
opinions, contrasting forces of change went after each other on different public media
platforms, and things often became personal and accusatory straight away. Hence,
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disagreements on things like different ideas and approaches could quickly devolve into
apparently adversarial relations. Whether the expression of frustrations was cathartic or
simply the product of an oppressive environment, hostilities were a notable part of the story
of change in Myanmar.
Contrasting networks had different priorities, strategies, interests, and visions of
change in Myanmar. Contrasting forces also carried different moral compasses. Right and
wrong, moral, and immoral were far from black and white in military-ruled Myanmar. What
one saw as clearly immoral, say bribery, brokering, or gaming with state officials, others saw
as entirely fitting. Those who took a stand and confronted the regime often spoke in
deontological terms. Deontology assesses the merit of the act and asks if the means or deed is
itself the moral move. By contrast, members of the Third Force often spoke in
consequentialist terms, where the morality of an effort is assessed in its outcome or
consequence.
Pathways challenges the positioning of people or groups as inherently righteous. Even
those who are waging valiant struggles against oppression can have their flaws and should
remain subject to question and critique. This lesson became front and center during the
transition in Myanmar. The status of those who stood up and spoke out against the junta was
regularly elevated to that of “savior,” radiating goodness and all that was right. The problem
is that a sort of lethargy can develop wherein flaws or contradictions are dismissed. Perceived
inherent goodness can transform into saviorism (Mutua, 2001), prompting simplistic moral
responses where nuanced political responses are required (Mamdani, 2009). All of these
points became increasingly pertinent when Myanmar’s democracy and human rights
networks went silent or even took part in the wave of anti-Muslim sentiment, aimed
especially but not exclusively at the Rohingya.3 Pertinently, Egreteau (2016) critiques the
iconification of Aung San Suu kyi and dissuades readers from “assuming that civil society
always acts as a force for political liberalization” (Rhoden). In the struggle for change under
junta-ruled Myanmar, it was never as easy as supporting those who were fighting the good
fight. Disparate viewpoints on strategy, sacrifice, and morality led to a situation in which one
had to consciously probe and reflect on questions like whose priorities deserve priority.
Strategic and moral disagreements can be enough to cause fractures. But it was the
allocation of attention, symbolic support, and resources—in other words the allocation of
recognition—that seemed to deepen divides. Matelski (2016) outlines such fault lines within
civil society and analyzes how foreign supporters can contribute not only support and agency
but also new divisions and hostilities. Recognition was a valuable commodity for those
struggling for change. Tilly notes that for social movements, “success rests at least as much
on outside recognition as on internal consensus” (2002, p. 97). Recognition led to legitimacy,
and legitimacy led to resources and a voice in policymaking circles. From this position, one
could influence the present, future, and past, as one could immediately push certain policies,
have a significant say in the agenda for transitioning Myanmar, and have a place in
Myanmar’s history books. Indeed, numerous informants spoke of the concern that the story
of change in Myanmar could have a very narrow scope that might leave out the massive
networks and efforts that did not grab global headlines.
Recognition, measured in the allocation of attention, symbolic support, and resources,
was and still remains a nerve in multiple ways. Why were some forces of change given so
much more recognition than others? Why did some forces of change gain seemingly no
recognition at all? The answer is bound up in discourse. Those who stood up and spoke out
against the regime were sure to gain the lion’s share of recognition because this is what the
world wants to see. Subversion and creation is taken less seriously due to a bias in the
discourse towards contention. In the end, those who took subtle or unfamiliar pathways to
change tended to gain peripheral recognition or none at all.
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Beyond frustration around the allocation of recognition, there was the issue of what
forces of change did with their spotlight and influence. Informants regularly noted their
frustrations with being spoken for without being spoken with, as noted above. There was a
feeling that those with recognition were not adequately reaching out or mobilizing the voices
and priorities of those outside their networks. As the forthcoming section will explain,
sanctions against the junta in Myanmar were sold as fulfilling the will of the people when
many forces of change saw sanctions as stifling change and harming their cause. Beyond
feeling left out of the conversation or even spoken for, people felt as though their
contributions and sacrifices were being written off. Challenging the trend of seeing sacrifice
only in blood spilt, living in exile, or punishment endured for refusing to go quiet, all of
which deserve the commendation, Pathways dedicates effort to bringing forward the sacrifice
of ordinary people who accepted a constant struggle to change the situation around them:
In military-ruled Myanmar, those who attempted to forge a better life for their
families and communities weathered risks and suffering on a daily basis. They put
their health on the line. Individuals worked days at a time, in terrible conditions. They
put themselves in harm’s way when working with and around the authorities. They
endured verbal and physical abuse from officials, including forced [labor]. They faced
constant insecurity. They lost family members. Their houses were burned. They faced
warfare with few [defenses]. They faced the fear of reprisal and the constant mental
pressure of oppression. These were the sacrifices of those who committed to a quiet,
everyday struggle for change. (pp. 140-141)
Lastly, taking recognition forward into the opening of early 2012, the dissolution of
the military government and the current transition, there are a range of questions that are
currently up for debate: Who should be taking credit for the change in Myanmar? How
should those networks be rewarded? Who is setting the transitional agenda? Might the
transition be leaving certain groups behind? Are the groups who are being spoken for actually
being spoken with? Whose priorities deserve priority and why?
Contrasting Histories of Sanctions
Was Myanmar a sanctioning success story? It depends on whose history of sanctions
comes to the fore. For the Free Burma lobbies and campaigns throughout the world, and
many of the opposition groups in Myanmar and along its borders, sanctions may be seen as
the catalyst or force multiplier that led to the eventual dissolution of the military regime. By
contrast, informants throughout military-ruled Myanmar brought a range of criticisms against
sanctions. There was the narrative that sanctions were fulfilling the will of the people, when
many in the field saw the sanctioning attitude as problematic, counterproductive, even
harmful. There was also the perception that sanctions emboldened the regime and further
isolated the population from the world and each other. Beyond these more specific critiques
were general feelings that sanctions were not contributing to the political muscles of the
grassroots organizers, to borrow from Prasse-Freeman (2010). Beyond field informant
feedback was the broader Third Force position that saw engagement as preferential to
sanctions, as their pathway was about creating new opportunities, relationships, and ideas.
For some forces of change in military ruled Myanmar, sanctions were a cure. For others,
sanctions were a disease. And this is where the debate was left when sanctioning
governments began to lift and roll back their measures in early 2012.
Reviewing the sanctions debate around Myanmar, nothing jumps out as definitively
new or unfamiliar. Supporters of sanctions will now point to the cumulative impact of
constant pressure on the regime; the way in which sanctions sent a message to the regime, the

On Pathways That Changed Myanmar: A Précis

59

opposition, and the world; and how the lifting of sanctions became a leverage point when the
junta began to dissolve into a democratically elected parliament. Skeptics and critics of
sanctions will offer quite the opposite assessment: that sanctions had minimal impact on the
regime’s dissolution and actually slowed change. Critics of sanctions will point to the way in
which the Myanmar junta used sanctions in their propaganda and question whether sanctions
actually did harm. Supporters of sanctioning will reiterate that the sanctions were targeted
exclusively at the junta and its cronies, and repeat that some of the most notable opposition
figures in Myanmar and abroad led the rally cry for sanctions. Both camps are able to put
together a compelling case backed by evidence of success or lack thereof. As in many
sanctioning episodes, the debate ends in a sort of stalemate, lending to a feeling of “...
watching a re-run on television; subconsciously we already know how it’s going to end”
(Prasse-Freeman, 2011). In this sense, there may be nothing unique about the history of
sanctions against the junta in Myanmar.
In turning the focus to the way in which forces of change who chose unconventional
pathways spoke about sanctions, Myanmar may hold important lessons for the broader
sanctioning discourse. For those committing to protest and contentious politics, sanctions can
be a boon for action. Indeed, there were a number of field informants throughout militaryruled Myanmar who saw sanctions as crucial both in their purpose and function. More
palpable, however, was the extent of frustration with the international sanctions regime. As
noted above, field informants spoke about the perceived emboldening effect of sanctions. To
illustrate this, one young man spoke of feeling as though the sanctions were cornering the
junta like a dog, placing the young man—and indeed the whole population—in that same
corner to fend for themselves. From this perspective, sanctions may have made subversion
more difficult by acting as a reason for callousness. While it may be too much to say that
sanctions definitively undermine subversion, if sanctions in any way complicate everyday
resistance, the mode of resistance most accessible to people pushing back against
authoritarian regimes, there seems cause for pause. Less subjective than the impact of
sanctions on subversion was the impact of sanctions on creation as a pathway to change.
Community organizations all over the country were striving constantly to create new
opportunities, find new resources and networks, and forge relationships with local officials
that were less adversarial and even mutually beneficial. Despite the authoritarian climate,
people were finding ways to build their political muscles, create new orbits of protection,
create new skills, and gain sources of leverage, and thus shift the needle in terms of control,
dependency, and power. They sought every avenue for new resources, opportunities,
interactions, conversations, ideas, information, space, and capabilities. Sanctions offered
them confrontation and deprivation. Creation as a pathway to change in military-ruled
Myanmar was the product of a refusal to wait for change from the government, and influxes
of resources through remittances, clandestine community endowment, and above ground
investments. These local injections lent to new capacities to navigate and overcome junta
rule. Sanctions were not an investment in local creation. Sanctions are part of a game to
pressure regimes from above, to punish those in command. They are a tool of
deprivation. Sanctions were an additional obstacle to overcome. Sanctions were thus seen by
those working to create in military-ruled Myanmar as cutting off rather than facilitating
avenues of new resources, opportunities, interactions, conversations, information, and space,
thus limiting possibilities and stifling change.
Histories of sanctions against military Myanmar are going to differ greatly. Rather
than resist this or pursue a more reconciliatory narrative, there seems utility in allowing the
contrasting histories to speak for themselves. This is an example of telling the story of change
in Myanmar with the candor it deserves. At the same time, there may be an important lesson
in the histories of sanctions in Myanmar. Creation made change happen at the personal,
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community, and systemic levels. That those who were striving to create new opportunities,
space, and leverage saw sanctions as an impediment seems reason enough to reflect on other
situations in which the sanctioning paradigm may be foreclosing on unconventional pathways
to change.
Lost in Transition
The military took everything from us for decades. Now they act like they own it. Their
land, their money, their houses, none of it belongs to them. They stole everything from
us. More than anything, we need our things back. We could lose our things forever.
(Mullen, 2016, p. 219)
In early 2014, a Karen man from Shan State, Myanmar spoke of an
encroaching transition that was formalizing the distribution of land, wealth, and benefits that
took shape over decades of pillaging under junta rule. Outreach efforts discerning what
people want out of this transition and whose priorities deserve priority have yet to begin,
beyond sporadic and heavily critiqued initiatives. Nonetheless, Myanmar is well on its way
down a pacted transitional path, and the vehicle is a still predatory adaptation of the junta’s
regulatory system. For the Karen man and those viewing the transition from a similar vantage
point, this could very well mean that what was stolen, confiscated, and extracted during the
decades of junta pillage may be lost forever under the rubric of the rule of law, progress, and
transition more broadly. To be clear, this is about more than lost land and leverage. There is
the risk of lost opportunities to imagine a different type of transition in Myanmar. There is a
risk of lost hope for groups throughout Myanmar. While Myanmar’s transitional course is not
set in stone, there seems an absence of space to push pause, audit, and address the past and
calibrate towards a transition that does not leave behind the people who need it most.
Managing expectations and responses to the range of needs and interests in
transitioning Myanmar is a formidable task. The pace of transformation alone makes it
difficult to ask questions like: Whose priorities deserve priority and why? Who should be
piloting this transition? How should the country balance the imperative of moving forward
and the imperative of dealing with the past? What does justice mean for different groups in
this transition? Where might there be alignment in contrasting visions of Myanmar’s future?
Still, the pace of transition alone does not explain the apparent absence of space to reckon
with the past.
The concluding chapter of Pathways brings into focus two dynamics that have led to
the embedding of predatory power in Myanmar’s transition. Firstly, the wave of violent
xenophobia came to the surface and spread throughout transitioning Myanmar, making
dealing with ongoing inhumanity and atrocities all consuming:
An old man outside a mosque in Yangon felt that while Rohingyas faced the most
intense threats, all Muslims in Myanmar were under attack. He went on to explain
how debates about citizenship, passports, and voting were all masking desires to expel
Muslims. This was not an exaggeration of the climate. It was and is an environment
where genocidal attitudes feature in public. Many individuals named driving Muslims
out of Myanmar as a priority of the transition. Muslims had no illusions about the
scale and intensity of the threat. They faced it every day. Unsurprisingly, in
interactions with members of the Muslim community they were observably guarded,
displaying many signs of self-protection. (Mullen, 2016, pp. 193-194)
With calls for the international intervention to prevent further digression towards genocide,
the focus of the transition necessarily remains in the here and now. During the scramble to
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figure out how to protect Rohingyas and other Muslim groups in Myanmar, the transition
carries on. The focus remains on dealing with the here and now. All the while, the transition
continues, and the predatory power that was built under decades of junta rule becomes further
embedded.
As triage focuses attention on the rise of violent xenophobia in transitioning
Myanmar, the push to formalize and invigorate the state may be legitimizing and entrenching,
rather than dislodging, predatory power. Rule of law advocacy and state-building more
generally has played out in a way that asks the people of Myanmar to accept their fates and
the distribution of privilege in the name of normalizing governance. An empirical illustration
of this dynamic played out around the Letpadaung struggle:
Perhaps the most unpredictable but telling transitional scene played out around the
Letpadaung copper mine protests, where protesting villagers turned their frustration
on Aung San Suu Kyi. Coverage of Letpadaung showed villagers waving signs saying
“No Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,” “No Commission Report” and “No More Investigation
Committee.” After experiencing land confiscations, environmental damage with
possible health ramifications, and violent crackdowns around November 2012, the
protesting villagers were told by Aung San Suu Kyi “to take their protest in
accordance with the law to the parliament in Nay Pyi Taw” (Ei Toe Lwin, 2013).
With the mine being under partner ownership of the military-owned Union of
Myanmar Economic Holdings Company (UMEHL) and Wanbao Mining, a Chinese
company, and the laws likely to legitimize the suffering of the villagers, this was not a
fate protesters would accept. In this scene, one can see the interweaving of new
freedoms and predations, as well as new opportunities and threats. (Mullen, 2016, p.
210)
Invigorating the state and promoting good governance in transitions requires surgical
precision, as this often means empowering and enabling the very institutions that delivered
oppression and protected predatory behavior. This level of precision has not been present
in Myanmar. As a result, efforts to formalize and strengthen governance in
transitioning Myanmar have had the unintended consequence of legitimating and solidifying
a still predatory system and status quo. In the early years of the transition, Jones (2014b)
warned:
These dynamics, which have empowered a narrow oligarchy, are less likely to be
undone by the reform process than to fundamentally shape the contours of reform.
Consequently, Myanmar’s future may not be unlike those of other Southeast Asian
states that have experienced similar developmental trajectories.
There was no panacea for military-ruled Myanmar, and there is no panacea for transitioning
Myanmar. As transitioning Myanmar attempts to find its way, Pathways urges a search for a
multiplicity of force and action, unforeseen trailblazers, new visions of politics, and power in
pursuit. In doing so, new pathways may manifest from below, from within, from the fore,
from above, and from unforeseen sources. Such disaggregation or proliferation can decrease
the likelihood of people or issues being left behind. Such a transition may be hard to envision
or even imagine at this difficult moment of transition, and this would be fitting for the
ongoing story of change in Myanmar.
Notes
1

8/8/88 refers to a series of country-wide strikes against the failing governance of the Burma Socialist Party
Programme around the date of 8 August 1988. These demonstrations were the stage where Aung San Suu Kyi
became the iconic leader of the democracy movement. After prolonged clashes between soldiers and
demonstrators, the junta launched a relentless attack – a crackdown that lives on as a legacy of the juntas
cruelty.
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A march in early September 2007 led to a brutal crackdown on innocent civilians and monks, giving way to
larger demonstrations. With a global audience watching, the junta launched a larger scale crackdown on 26
September, leading to outrage locally and globally.
3
Referring to the work of Jennifer Leehey, Elliott Prasse-Freeman (2013) provides a useful summation of the
dynamics surrounding the discrimination against Rohingya: “[T]he Rohingya have increasingly been stripped of
that name; more and more they have become only ‘Bengalis’. And so, killing in the name of Buddhism, killing
in the name of the legitimate nation, this rhetoric is trying to kill the name Rohingya itself. For while the
‘Rooinga’ were recognized already in 1799 well before the First Anglo-Burmese War, and the Burmese state
has recognized them on numerous occasions in the past the 2013 government report examining the violence,
referred to the Rohingya in every instance as ‘Bengalis’ (Stout 2013), and security forces have forced Rohingya
to refer to themselves that way (Ferrie 2013)”.
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